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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Highways and historic districts mix like oil and water, 
and when a new highway must go through an historic area, 
historic preservationists and federal and state highway 
officials are likely to clash over the preferred route. Such 
controversies take on a legal cast as the result of Section 
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. 
S 303(c)(2) (amended by and codified at 23 U.S.C. S 138), 
which provides: 
 
       [T]he Secretary [of Transportation] shall not approve 
       any program or project . . . which requires the use of 
       any . . . land from an historic site of national, State, or 
       local significance as so determined by such officials 
       unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative 
       to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes 
       all possible planning to minimize harm to such . . . 
       historic site resulting from such use. 
 
Id. 
 
The situs of the present controversy is Danville, 
Pennsylvania, a picturesque county seat overlooking the 
Susquehanna River. Danville, which contains an historic 
district that was nominated to the National Register of 
Historic Places in 1994, is joined with Riverside, the town 
across the river, by a deteriorating bridge. In the early 
1980s, federal and state agencies decided that the bridge 
had to be replaced. The plaintiffs, Danville area residents 
who formed the Concerned Citizens Alliance, sued the U.S. 
Department of Transportation, the Federal Highway 
Administration ("FHWA"), and the Pennsylvania Department 
of Transportation ("PennDoT") in the District Court over the 
defendants' selection of a bridge alignment that would send 
traffic through Danville along Factory Street after it exited 
the new bridge. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants failed to 
comply with the requirements of Section 4(f)(2) by 
arbitrarily and capriciously selecting the Factory Street 
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Underpass alignment as the preferred alternative. The 
plaintiffs also submit that the defendants ignored the 
conclusion of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
("ACHP") that the Mill Street alternative would minimize 
harm to the Danville Historic District. Although both 
alternatives pass through the Historic District, plaintiffs 
maintain that the defendants failed to adequately support 
their conclusion that the Underpass alternative was 
preferable. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants violated both Section 4(f) and the National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C.S 4321 et 
seq., by failing to evaluate in detail an alternative that 
would include, in addition to rebuilding the current bridge, 
building a second bridge upstream to allow traffic to reach 
the nearby connection to Interstate 80 without going 
through the center of Danville. The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants on all grounds, and 
this appeal followed. 
 
We devote our attention to three critical issues. First, we 
consider the level of deference the FHWA owes to the ACHP, 
which is an expert agency created to comment on federally- 
assisted projects involving historic properties, and whether 
the appropriate deference was given. Second, we evaluate 
whether the defendants acted arbitrarily in concluding that 
the Factory Street Underpass alternative would inflict the 
least amount of harm on the Historic District. Third, we 
determine whether the defendants violated NEPA. We 
conclude that, although the views of the ACHP are entitled 
to deference, the ACHP cannot mandate a particular 
outcome. Rather, we must carefully review the record to 
assure that the views of the ACHP were in fact considered 
and any concerns it raised were answered. We also 
conclude, based on the entire administrative record, that 
they were, and that the defendants did not act arbitrarily or 
capriciously in selecting the Factory Street Underpass 
alternative. Finally, we agree with the District Court that 
the plaintiffs' NEPA claim is without merit. We therefore will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
The Danville-Riverside Bridge carries Pennsylvania Route 
54 across the Susquehanna and links Danville to Riverside. 
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Route 54 (in the form of Mill Street) passes through the 
center of Danville and provides access to Interstate 80 a few 
miles northwest of Danville. In 1983, defendants FHWA and 
PennDoT decided to replace the old Danville-Riverside 
Bridge, which was becoming unsafe. 
 
Some twelve options were put on the table. The 
alternatives relevant to this appeal included the"No-Build" 
alternative, the Mill Street alternative ("MS alternative"), the 
Factory Street At-Grade alternative ("FSAG alternative"), the 
Factory Street Underpass alternative ("FSU alternative"), 
and the Mill Street plus Bypass alternative ("MS&B 
alternative"). Originally, the goal of the bridge replacement 
project was just that: to replace the bridge. Therefore, the 
FHWA initially refused to consider the MS&B alternative, 
since it involved not only replacing the existing Danville- 
Riverside Bridge but also building another bridge 1.2 miles 
upstream to siphon off "through" traffic to reduce the 
number of cars and trucks passing through Danville's 
Historic District. However, Mill Street, on which many 
shops and businesses are located, is the main commercial 
street in the district, and in response to comments from the 
Mill Street business community, the FHWA broadened the 
stated purpose of the project to include reducing traffic 
congestion to restore the economic health of Mill Street. The 
MS&B alternative was therefore placed on the table, 
although it never received detailed evaluation. 
 
The Evaluation of Project Need listed twenty objectives 
that the bridge replacement project was to fulfill. These 
included replacing the deteriorating bridge; minimizing 
vehicle delay and traffic congestion on Mill Street; 
maintaining a link between Danville and Riverside through 
the year 2013; managing traffic congestion on Factory 
Street; restoring the Mill Street neighborhood, quality of 
life, and business district; and minimizing pedestrians' 
exposure to traffic. 
 
Importantly, both Mill Street and Factory Street are in 
the Historic District. The Final Environmental Impact 
Statement ("FEIS") describes the collection of commercial, 
civic, and residential structures along Mill Street as dating 
"from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth. 
The two and three story buildings are predominantly 
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Italianate in style with features including blind arches, 
corbelling, bracketed and highly decorative roof and 
storefront cornices, columns and window hoods." The FEIS 
also describes the buildings on West Market Street, a street 
linking Mill and Factory Streets: "A range of architectural 
styles are represented including Federal, Greek Revival, 
Italianate, Second Empire, Victorian Eclectic, Queen Anne, 
Shingle and Georgian Revival." Factory Street, which is a 
smaller street one block west of Mill Street, contains mostly 
residences--both historic and non-historic--and boasts 
"large, stately buildings" that were "the homes of Danville's 
wealthy industrialists who shaped the iron industry as well 
as the architectural character of the present day West 
Market Street neighborhood." 
 
Currently, bridge traffic flows along Mill Street and 
travels the length of the Historic District, although to avoid 
the congestion, some traffic cuts west on West Market 
Street to access Factory Street, which eventually connects 
up with Route 54. The FSU alternative would realign traffic 
coming off the bridge on the Danville side by routing traffic 
down Factory Street and through a 345-foot "cut-and- 
cover" underpass that would begin between Front and 
Market Streets and end between Market and Mahoning 
Streets. The MS alternative would replace the bridge but 
maintain the current traffic flow along Mill Street. The 
FSAG alternative would simply route traffic onto and along 
Factory Street without directing traffic through an 
underpass. 
 
In considering the various alternatives, the FHWA 
engaged in the requisite Section 4(f) and NEPA analyses. As 
we detail below, Section 4(f) requires the FHWA to ensure 
that there are "no prudent and feasible" alternatives that 
would avoid using historic properties, and, in the absence 
of a feasible alternative, to undertake "all possible planning 
to minimize harm" to the Danville Historic District. In 
performing its 4(f) analysis, the FHWA garnered input from 
the ACHP and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission ("PHMC"). Both historical groups notified the 
FHWA that they preferred the MS alternative. In a letter 
dated January 14, 1994, the ACHP complained that the 
FSU alternative, which was favored by FHWA and which 
 
                                6 
  
included the underpass, would destroy vistas, landscaping, 
and pedestrian and vehicle circulation patterns, and would 
create an overwhelming visual intrusion in the form of large 
retaining walls. The ACHP also feared that the increased 
traffic on Factory Street would create noise and fumes that 
would be out of character in that part of the district. Noting 
that Mill Street was the traditional gateway into the town, 
the ACHP felt that traffic was not out of character there, 
and that the MS alternative was thus the "least harm" 
alternative under 4(f)(2). 
 
In response to the ACHP's concerns about the FSU 
alternative, PennDoT retained Mary Means & Associates, a 
private consulting firm with expertise in urban design and 
economic analysis of historic areas, to evaluate the MS and 
FSU alternatives. The Means firm wrote a report that 
acknowledged that the FSU cut-and-cover alternative would 
in fact do irreparable damage to the town, but concluded 
that the FSU option would cause the least damage to the 
long term viability of the Historic District. The Means 
Report also stated that the MS alternative failed to relieve 
the serious congestion and turning movements caused by 
the constant truck traffic in an older downtown. 
 
Pursuant to NEPA, and as part of the decisional process, 
the FHWA prepared first a Draft and then a Final 
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS," "DEIS," or "FEIS"), 
both of which contained the required Section 4(f) 
evaluations. The EIS considered all of the alternatives listed 
above (and more), but concluded that only four merited 
detailed study as reasonable and prudent options: the FSU 
alternative, the MS alternative, the FSAG alternative, and 
the No-Build alternative. The FHWA did not perform a 
detailed study of the MS&B alternative, since the Agency 
deemed that alternative unreasonable. 
 
The FHWA ultimately selected the FSU alternative. The 
ACHP and the FHWA signed a Memorandum of Agreement 
("MOA") which stated that the FSU alternative had been 
chosen and prescribed several measures to mitigate its 
impacts. The FHWA subsequently signed a Record of 
Decision ("ROD"), memorializing the FSU alternative as the 
selected alignment for the project. In its Section 4(f) 
analysis, the ROD concluded that the FSU alternative 
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would best minimize harm to the Historic District by (i) 
physically and visually separating traffic from the Historic 
District; (ii) reducing traffic on Mill Street; and (iii) requiring 
the demolition of a smaller contributing historic structure 
than the MS alternative would. The ROD also deemed the 
Mill Street alternative undesirable because the Mill Street 
traffic would detract from the atmosphere in the historic 
downtown area. 
 
Since construction on the bridge was scheduled to begin 
in July 1998, the plaintiffs, who continued to object to the 
selection of the FSU alternative, moved for a temporary 
restraining order and a preliminary injunction in late May 
1998.1 The district court denied the motions.2 On the same 
day, the parties also filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. In response to the defendants' motion, the 
plaintiffs attached a letter from the ACHP dated June 29, 
1998, explaining that its decision to sign the MOA did not 
constitute a retraction of its earlier statement that it 
preferred the MS alternative. The District Court granted the 
defendants' motion to strike the ACHP letter from the record.3 
It also denied plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction, 
and then granted summary judgment for the defendants. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At oral argument in February 1999, the parties represented that 
construction on the bridge had not yet begun. 
 
2. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs simultaneously filed an 
interlocutory 
appeal from the denial of the TRO and a motion for an injunction 
pending appeal. A panel of this court denied plaintiffs' motion for an 
injunction pending appeal and dismissed the appeal from the denial of 
the TRO. 
 
3. The plaintiffs contend that the District Court abused its discretion in 
striking the ACHP letter from the record, since that letter clarifies the 
ACHP's current position on the FSU alternative. The ACHP points out 
that its decision to sign the MOA did not indicate its concurrence in the 
FSU alternative, but rather bound the defendants to the mitigation 
measures contained therein. Indeed, the defendants concede that the 
MOA "asks for concurrence on mitigation measures not concurrence on 
the selected alternative." We need not decide whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in striking the document because, even factoring in 
the ACHP's continued opposition to the FSU alternative, we still conclude 
that the FHWA did not act arbitrarily in selecting that alternative. 
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This appeal followed, over which we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. The plaintiffs seek the 
cessation of preparatory construction activities and a 
remand to FHWA with instructions to comply with Section 
4(f) and NEPA. When, as here, we are reviewing an 
administrative agency's final decision under S 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 701 et seq., we 
review the district court's summary judgment decision de 
novo, while "applying the appropriate standard of review to 
the agency's decision." See Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 
623, 632 (6th Cir. 1997). The appropriate standards of 
review of the agency's decisions are explained below. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. The Requirements of Section 4(f) 
 
Because the Danville-Riverside Bridge replacement 
project is a federal-aid project that will, under any proposed 
alternative, "use" at least one historic structure in 
Danville's Historic District,4 the project must satisfy the 
requirements of Section 4(f) of the Department of 
Transportation Act, 23 U.S.C. S 138 ("Section 4(f)"), as well 
as the requirements of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C) 
(mandating an EIS and consultations with federal agencies 
that have special expertise when an agency undertakes 
major federal action affecting the quality of the human 
environment). Section 4(f) mandates that the protection of 
historic properties, parks, recreation areas, and wildlife 
refuges be given paramount importance in transportation 
planning. As discussed above, it does so by requiring the 
Secretary of Transportation to use non-historic property 
unless there is no other feasible alternative, see Section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Both courts and the Department of Transportation have explained 
what "use" means in this context. "The term`use' is to be construed 
broadly, not limited to the concept of a physical taking, but includes 
areas that are significantly, adversely affected by the project." See 
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 
569, 583 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1092 
(9th Cir. 1982)); Department of Transportation Order No. 5610.1A, 
P 9(c)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 23681 (1971). 
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4(f)(1), and to minimize harm to the historic property once 
it is determined that such land must be used, see Section 
4(f)(2). It is undisputed that only Section 4(f)(2) is at issue 
in this case, since each alternative before the FHWA 
involved a "use" of at least one historic structure in the 
Historic District.5 
 
Under Section 4(f)(2), the Secretary of Transportation 
must perform a balancing test when weighing the 
alternatives under consideration. We agree with the 
Eleventh Circuit's explication that 
 
       [S]ection 4(f)(2) requires a simple balancing process 
       which totals the harm caused by each alternate route 
       to section 4(f) areas and selects the option which does 
       the least harm. The only relevant factor in making a 
       determination whether an alternative route minimizes 
       harm is the quantum of harm to the park or historic 
       site caused by the alternative. Considerations that 
       might make the route imprudent, e.g., failure to satisfy 
       the project's purpose, are simply not relevant to this 
       determination. If the route does not minimize harm, it 
       need not be selected. 
 
Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Federal Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 
700, 716 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); see also 
Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 85-86 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Although the No-Build alternative would not"use" any historic 
property, the plaintiffs do not argue that the defendants violated 4(f)(1) 
by failing to select the No-Build alternative. Section 4(f)(1) 
specifically 
requires that the Secretary must select an alternative that does not use 
historic property unless that alternative is infeasible. Here, because the 
No-Build alternative would not accomplish any of the Project Needs, it is 
clear why the plaintiffs do not argue that this alternative was feasible. 
 
Likewise, while the No-Build alternative was considered in the 
defendants' 4(f)(2) analysis, we conclude below that there is an implicit 
"reasonable and prudent" requirement in Section 4(f)(2). See infra at Part 
II.D. Therefore, while the No-Build alternative technically would impose 
the least harm on historic property under 4(f)(2), the plaintiffs do not 
argue that it was arbitrary not to select the No-Build alternative as the 
preferred option. 
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In a Section 4(f) challenge, the plaintiff bears the burden 
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
Secretary acted improperly in approving the use of 
protected property. See Ringsred v. Dole, 828 F.2d 1300, 
1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. 
Dole, 707 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1983)). Under Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), 
the Supreme Court made clear that while the Secretary of 
Transportation's decision is entitled to a presumption of 
regularity, a court nevertheless must subject the 
Secretary's decision to "probing, in-depth" review. See id. at 
415. 
 
When reviewing a Section 4(f)(2) determination, a court 
must decide whether the Secretary's ultimate decision was 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See Citizens 
Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) (applying arbitrary and capricious review to 
Secretary's Section 4(f)(2) determination); Coalition on 
Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (same). This assessment requires an evaluation of 
whether the decision was based on consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there was a clear error of 
judgment. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. The Section 
4(f)(2) balancing process "permits the Secretary to engage in 
a broad consideration of the `relative harm' arising from 
various alternates [sic]." Coalition on Sensible Transp. Inc. v. 
Dole, 642 F. Supp. 573, 603 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 
60 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 
The plaintiffs--who believe that the FSU alternative is not 
the alternative that would cause the least harm to the 
Danville Historic District--claim that the defendants have 
violated Section 4(f)(2) in three ways. First, they allege that 
the FHWA "completely ignore[d]" the ACHP's conclusion 
that the MS alternative was preferable. Second, plaintiffs 
contend that each of the defendants' stated reasons for 
selecting the FSU alternative deserves no weight, and that 
nothing in the administrative record supports the 
conclusion that the FSU alternative best minimizes harm. 
Third, they argue that the defendants arbitrarily excluded 
from detailed consideration an alternative that might have 
imposed the least harm on the Historic District--the MS&B 
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alternative. In light of these arguments, we will review for 
abuse of discretion the Secretary's decision that the FSU 
alternative would do the least harm to Section 4(f) 
resources. 
 
B. Section 106: Deference to the Advisory Council on 
       Historic Preservation 
 
The initial basis on which plaintiffs contend that the 
defendants' actions were arbitrary and capricious is that 
the defendants failed to take into consideration the 
comments of the ACHP. This consideration stems from 16 
U.S.C. S 470f (also known as "Section 106"), under which 
the Secretary must take into consideration the comments of 
the ACHP when contemplating an undertaking that will 
affect a site or structure listed in the National Register. As 
a preliminary matter, we must determine what level of 
deference the Secretary owes to the ACHP's assessment of 
the impacts of the MS and FSU alternatives on the Danville 
Historic District. 
 
The ACHP is an expert federal agency created by 
Congress pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. S 470 et seq. (1994)) ("NHPA"). Under 
Section 106 of the NHPA, the ACHP must be given a 
"reasonable opportunity to comment" on the effect of 
federally-assisted projects on historic properties. See id. We 
must decide what weight a federal agency must give to the 
ACHP's comments; the amount of deference owed the ACHP 
will factor into our analysis of whether the Secretary's 
calculus was arbitrary or capricious. 
 
Both courts and the relevant regulations suggest that 
Section 106 imposes a limited set of obligations on federal 
agencies. See Waterford Citizens' Ass'n v. Reilly, 970 F.2d 
1287, 1290 (4th Cir. 1992); 36 C.F.R. S 60.2(a); 36 C.F.R. 
S 800.6 (explaining the Section 106 process and requiring 
that the Agency "consider" the ACHP's comments). Though 
the text of Section 106 does not specify what the Advisory 
Council's "opportunity to comment" on a project entails, the 
Advisory Council's regulations and the legislative history 
demonstrate that the total response required of the agency 
is not great. See Waterford, 970 F.2d at 1290 (noting that 
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Section 106 is silent on the proper disposition of a 
disagreement between the Advisory Council and the agency 
over the potential adverse effect of an undertaking). Indeed, 
even the ACHP's own regulations, see 36 C.F.R. S 60.2(a), 
state that after having given the ACHP an opportunity to 
comment, "the Federal agency may adopt any course of 
action it believes is appropriate. While the Advisory Council 
comments must be taken into account and integrated into 
the decisionmaking process, program decisions rest with 
the agency implementing the undertaking." See id. 
 
The Waterford court concluded, "There is thus no 
suggestion in either the statute or the legislative history 
that section 106 was intended to impose upon federal 
agencies anything more than a duty to keep the Advisory 
Council informed of the effect of federal undertakings and 
to allow it to make suggestions to mitigate adverse impacts 
on the historic sites under its protection." See 970 F.2d at 
1291; see also Vieux Carre Property Owners v. Brown, 948 
F.2d 1436, 1447 (5th Cir. 1991) ("[B]ecause, as the Corps 
points out, the Advisory Council's comments are advisory 
only and do not bind the Corps to a particular course of 
action, the Corps might decide not to require mitigation 
measures even if the Advisory Council should recommend 
them."); Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Interstate Commerce 
Comm'n, 848 F.2d 1246, 1260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting 
that Section 106 is a "stop, look, and listen" provision that 
merely requires that an agency acquire information before 
acting). We agree. 
 
While the ACHP's recommendations do not and cannot 
control agency decisionmaking, the relevant agency must 
demonstrate that it has read and considered those 
recommendations. See Coalition Against a Raised 
Expressway, Inc. v. Dole, No. 84-1219-C, 1986 WL 25480 
(S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 1986) (holding that the agency complied 
with Section 106 when its responses to ACHP comments 
indicated that it took the comments into consideration even 
though it ultimately disagreed with them), aff'd, 835 F.2d 
803 (11th Cir. 1988).6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. One court has suggested that judgments made by the ACHP deserve 
"great weight." Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 858 
(9th Cir. 1982). However, Pierce cited no case or statute in support of 
its 
"great weight" language, and we can find no support for its conclusion. 
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Counseled by the congressional inclusion of Section 106 
in the NHPA, we acknowledge historic preservation as a 
highly important societal interest. As a civilization, we 
suffer a terrible loss if we do not make every reasonable 
effort to preserve our heritage, which may be enshrined in 
bricks and mortar as well as in books and documents. We 
think, however, that Congress was delivering this message 
primarily to the federal agencies, rather than trying to 
instruct federal appellate courts to inject some subtle (and 
inevitably elusive) calibration into their process of reviewing 
historic preservation cases. Given the plethora of federal 
regulatory statutes that impose obligations on the judiciary 
to review administrative decisions, such a construction 
might lead to a hodge-podge jurisprudence. 
 
We agree that the FHWA must take the ACHP's 
comments into account when balancing alternatives, and 
must demonstrate that it gave the ACHP's conclusion 
genuine attention: Congress did not create the ACHP so 
that it could be a toothless agency. However, the ACHP's 
own regulations are clear that the acting federal agency 
need not agree with the ACHP's determination that a given 
alternative is the "least harm" alternative. In sum, a federal 
agency undertaking a project affecting historic properties is 
not obligated to give the ACHP's opinion so much weight 
that it is foreclosed from making its own decision, though 
it must make clear in the record that the ACHP's comments 
were taken seriously. 
 
The ACHP opined that "the Mill Street alignment best 
avoids or reduces the effects of this project on the Danville 
Historic District and should be considered the preferable 
alignment." The ACHP reasoned that the proposed 
mitigation of the cut-and-cover section would not 
adequately minimize the effects of added traffic on the 
Factory Street neighborhood; that the FSU option would 
create "harmful visual impacts"; and that the underpass 
would destroy important topographical, landscape, and 
circulation systems that contribute to the Historic District's 
character and significance. Although they acknowledge the 
correctness of the proposition that the ACHP's concurrence 
in the selected alternative is not required by statute, 
plaintiffs (in effect) nonetheless contend that because the 
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FHWA did not agree with the ACHP that the MS alternative 
imposed the least harm, the FHWA must have acted 
capriciously. 
 
We address their contention under our proper standard 
of review. Despite the plaintiffs' assertions that the 
defendants ignored the ACHP's comments and thus acted 
arbitrarily in selecting the FSU alternative, the 
administrative record reveals that the defendants seriously 
took into consideration the ACHP's objections. First, the 
record shows that the ACHP has been heavily involved in 
this project. A number of letters and memoranda that 
passed between the parties--either written by the ACHP 
itself or by FHWA and PennDoT--indicate that the 
defendants were aware of the importance of trying to gain 
the ACHP's support for the FSU alternative. See, e.g., A 584 
(letter from PennDoT) ("We concur that consultation with 
the State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and the 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation is crucial for 
advancement of the preferred alternative."); A 589 (letter 
from FHWA) (scheduling a conference call to discuss 
ACHP's January 14 letter expressing a preference for the 
MS alternative); A 652 (Mary Means letter) (making 
revisions in draft report based on work session with PHMC 
and ACHP). 
 
Second, after the ACHP first expressed its concerns, the 
defendants hired a consultant suggested to them by PHMC. 
Third, the ACHP and PHMC were involved in drafting the 
mitigation measures for the selected alternative. The record 
thus demonstrates that the defendants considered the 
ACHP's comments, and at least to some degree integrated 
those comments into the decisionmaking process both 
substantively and procedurally. Section 106 does not 
require more. We do not, however, put this subject to rest 
with these comments about the ACHP's role; rather, in 
considering whether the Secretary acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously under Section 4(f)(2), we perforce examine the 
substantive basis for the defendants' disagreement with the 
views of the ACHP. 
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C. Did the Secretary Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously 
       Under 4(f)(2)? 
 
In addition to their concern about the way the defendants 
treated the ACHP's opinion, the plaintiffs submit that there 
is no support in the administrative record for choosing the 
FSU alternative as the "least harm" alternative, and that 
the defendants therefore acted arbitrarily in choosing that 
alternative as the bridge replacement plan. Specifically, the 
plaintiffs argue that the defendants ignored the noise, air 
quality, vibration, traffic, and visual impacts that the FSU 
alternative would have on the Historic District; that the 
Means Report does not support defendants' position 
because it focused on the economic health of the town 
rather than its historic preservation; and that Mary Means 
was biased toward the FSU alternative since she was later 
selected to implement part of the mitigation plans under 
that alternative. We will address the first two concerns; we 
find no merit in the plaintiffs' third claim, since Means 
drafted her report with no knowledge that she might later 
be retained as part of the mitigation design team, and we 
reject it summarily. 
 
1. Factory Street and West Market Street 
 
First, the plaintiffs claim that the FSU alternative will 
destroy the Factory Street "streetscape" and will create a 
visual intrusion in the form of retaining walls around the 
underpass.7 The ACHP concluded that the streetscape at 
the intersection of Factory and West Market Streets (under 
which the underpass would run) was an important element 
of the Historic District that would be completely altered by 
the underpass. Based on National Park Service guidelines, 
which acknowledge that intangibles like streetscapes and 
layouts of roads are important to the integrity of historic 
districts, see U.S. Dep't of Interior, National Park Service, 
National Register Bulletin #15, How to Apply the National 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. While the term "streetscape" does not appear in the NHPA or in the 
regulations promulgated thereunder, it is useful in a Section 106 
analysis. We take it to refer to the visual impact of, and the interplay 
between, the natural and architectural elements that comprise the 
affected area. 
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Register Criteria for Evaluation 44 (Rev. 1991), we think 
that the plaintiffs are correct that the defendants must 
consider more than the individual buildings and structures 
in an historic district when analyzing the impact of a 
project. 
 
In the instant case, however, the record reflects that the 
defendants have considered the effect of the FSU alternative 
on the extant streetscape. First, the underpass itself is an 
attempt to minimize the effect of increased above-ground 
traffic on Factory Street. It not only eliminates traffic on a 
portion of Factory Street, but it also eliminates it at the 
most important--and beautiful--intersection in the Historic 
District: the intersection of Factory and West Market Streets.8 
Second, the planned mitigation measures in the FEIS and 
MOA will reduce the change imposed on the streetscape of 
Factory Street. The measures create a cover section on top 
of the underpass, at street level, that will offer an open 
space in the Historic District. The landscaping and design 
of the cover will be developed in consultation with local 
officials, a citizens' advisory committee, and the State 
Historic Preservation Office, to be in keeping with the 
current character of Factory Street. Apparently, features 
such as gas lamps and attractive landscaping are 
contemplated. 
 
The plaintiffs submit that even if the top of the 
underpass were designed to mimic a functional street, the 
presence of safety fencing and vehicle barriers will still be 
intrusive, and the underpass will, by definition, change the 
streetscape of much of Factory Street. We agree. However, 
the street-level surface of the underpass will offer some 
aesthetic benefits, and the plaintiffs' criticism, while valid, 
must be placed in the entire balancing calculus. 
 
The plaintiffs' second argument is not unlike theirfirst: 
that the defendants have ignored that the FSU alternative 
would alter the existing character of Factory Street. As the 
plaintiffs correctly note, "Adverse effects on historic 
properties include, but are not limited to: . . .[i]ntroduction 
of visual, audible, or atmospheric elements that are out of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The FEIS states that the "focal point" of Market Street "is the 
intersection of Market and Factory Streets." 
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character with the property or alter its setting." See 36 
C.F.R. S 800.9(b)(3). The plaintiffs characterize Factory 
Street as quiet and residential, in contrast to Mill Street, 
where heavy traffic is to be expected. To some extent, the 
defendants agree with this characterization, noting in the 
FEIS that Factory Street is residential in nature. However, 
it appears from the record that only one of the historic 
structures facing Factory Street is currently a residence, 
although a number of other historic structures, such as 
carriage houses and garages, front Factory Street. 9 
 
The Secretary did not ignore this character-altering 
drawback to the FSU alternative; indeed, the Means Report 
acknowledges that the FSU alternative will affect the 
character of Factory Street, and balances it against other 
considerations. However, Factory Street's character may not 
be altered as drastically as the plaintiffs suggest, since 
Factory Street currently is exposed to a fair amount of 
traffic composed of cars and trucks that cut from Mill 
Street across Market Street onto Factory Street in order to 
avoid the heavy traffic on Mill Street. In addition, the 
Secretary took into account the benefits to the existing 
character of historic Mill Street in choosing the FSU 
alternative. 
 
Third, the plaintiffs claim that the FSU alternative will 
isolate the part of West Market Street that lies west of 
Factory Street from the rest of the Danville Historic District 
by making it hard for pedestrians to cross Factory Street. 
We do not think that this argument has much to commend 
it. The cross streets of Mahoning, Market, and Front will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. There are four large residential structures at the intersection of 
Factory and West Market Streets, each of which has been deemed a 
contributing element to the Historic District. None of the four structures 
actually faces Factory Street. Moreover, Factory Street has experienced 
some commercialization, since a number of buildings have been 
transformed into executive and professional offices. The Evaluation of 
Project Need records that ninety people reside on Mill Street, in second- 
and third-story apartments over small stores and shops at street level, 
whereas six people reside on Factory Street. Two residences facing 
Factory Street would be "used" under the FSU alternative. One building 
is a non-contributing (that is, non-historic), multi-family dwelling; the 
other residence is a contributing structure at 9 Factory Street. 
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remain open to local traffic and existing sidewalks will be 
maintained. While portions of the west side of Factory 
Street will be slightly less accessible to pedestrians under 
the FSU alternative, this factor is not a critical one in 
determining whether the defendants acted arbitrarily. 
 
2. Traffic 
 
The plaintiffs also complain about the increased traffic 
volume on Factory Street that will occur under the FSU 
alternative. According to the plaintiffs, traffic would 
increase 400% on Factory Street under the FSU alternative. 
The defendants, by contrast, calculate that by the year 
2013, traffic would have increased only 226%. Even if we 
assume that the plaintiffs' estimate is correct, traffic on 
West Market between Factory and Mill Streets is expected 
under the FSU alternative to drop by the year 2013 from 
525 cars at peak hours to 125 cars at peak, a 420% 
decrease. Under the MS alternative, cars and trucks would 
continue to detour onto Factory Street to avoid Mill Street 
traffic, thus failing to abate traffic problems on either 
Factory or Mill Streets. However, under the FSU alternative, 
the traffic volume on Mill Street would decrease 
substantially. Therefore, though the FSU alternative will 
increase traffic on Factory Street, it will reduce traffic on 
other streets in the Danville Historic District. We therefore 
cannot hold that--based on traffic projections--it was 
arbitrary for the defendants to opt for the FSU alternative. 
 
3. Noise, Exhaust, and Vibration 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the defendants failed to consider 
the increased traffic noise and exhaust fumes that the 
underpass would foster. The record suggests otherwise. As 
for exhaust, the defendants calculated the expected carbon 
monoxide levels at seventeen sites and determined that 
none of the predicted concentrations would exceed National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards. While plaintiffs appear to 
be correct that the defendants did not study the impact of 
the predicted carbon monoxide levels on the historic 
structures on Factory Street, we do not believe that this 
omission alone renders the defendants' judgment arbitrary. 
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Regarding noise, it is clear that the defendants performed 
ample noise studies at fourteen selected sites on Market, 
Mill, and Factory Streets, and three sites in Riverside. 
Under the No-Build alternative, the noise levels at eleven of 
the seventeen sites would equal or exceed abatement levels. 
Under the MS alternative, the levels at eleven of the 
seventeen sites would equal or exceed abatement levels. 
Under the FSU alternative, the levels at eight of the 
seventeen sites would equal or exceed abatement levels. 
Comparing the alternatives by site, the decibel level is 
expected to be louder in 2013 under the MS alternative for 
eight sites, and louder under the FSU alternative for six 
sites. 
 
The plaintiffs note that the FSU alternative would 
increase the noise impact from its present levels at nine of 
seventeen sites by 2013. They fail to note that the MS 
alternative would increase the noise impact from its present 
levels at all seventeen of the sites. Only one site will be 
directly impacted by portal noise under the FSU alternative; 
the structure on that site will be relocated. The plaintiffs 
also express concern that the underpass will eliminate only 
a small amount of noise relative to the intrusion it imposes 
on the area. However, the District Court found that there 
were "four large residential structures" at the intersection of 
Factory Street and West Market Street (all four of which are 
contributing structures to the Historic District) and that the 
noise impacts at the intersection of Factory and Market 
would be significantly lower under the FSU alternative than 
the MS alternative, since those four structures would be 
shielded from Factory Street noise by the underpass. In 
sum, from a noise standpoint, the FSU alternative is quite 
clearly the preferable choice. 
 
Although the plaintiffs do not indicate that they are 
concerned about the effects of vibration on historic 
structures under the various alternatives, the record 
indicates that the FSU alternative will ameliorate vibration 
effects both on Factory Street and on Mill Street. The 
defendants calculated that the FSU alternative would result 
in "vibration magnitudes at the residences on Factory 
Street and Market Street which are less than existing 
vibration magnitudes." They reached this conclusion by 
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noting that the new underpass increases the current 
pavement surface area by 58%. Since vibration energy is 
dissipated through pavement, the increase in traffic 
presumably would be countered by the increased (and 
sunken) surface area of the underpass's pavement. 
 
The Means Report compares the vibration effects on Mill 
and Factory Streets under current and future plans. The 
Report points out that the current level of vibration on Mill 
Street "threatens the long-term life of the historic 
commercial structures that line the downtown's central 
artery" and that the reduced vibration on Mill Street under 
the FSU alternative makes "redeveloping second story 
space" along Mill Street "more attractive." It also concludes 
that PennDoT's vibration studies "do not indicate a 
significant deterioration in terms of livability near the cut- 
and-cover underpass." The record thus suggests that the 
FSU alternative will better ameliorate the impacts of 
vibration on the Historic District. 
 
4. Historic Structures to be Destroyed 
 
The plaintiffs strongly object to the fact that the 
defendants calculated the square footage of the two historic 
structures to be relocated or destroyed (one under the FSU 
alternative and one under the MS alternative) and 
compared the footage when arguing that the FSU 
alternative was preferable. The structure to be taken under 
the FSU alternative covers .1 acre, whereas the structure to 
be taken under the MS alternative covers .3 acres. The 
defendants submit that it is better to take a smaller 
structure than a larger one. Case law teaches that the 
evaluation of harm requires a far more subtle calculation 
than merely totaling the number of acres affected. See 
District of Columbia Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 
1231, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs do 
not indicate why the smaller structure is the more 
historically significant (though it is their burden to show 
that the defendants' decision was arbitrary and capricious), 
and the record discussion of the two buildings in the FEIS 
does not indicate that they differ significantly in historical 
worth. 
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The FEIS describes 2-4 Front Street, the historic 
structure that would be taken under the MS alternative, as 
a multi-family residential structure. The FEIS states, "The 
two story frame dwelling which dates from the late 19th 
century is in good condition, but has fair historical integrity 
due to the application of aluminum siding." The FEIS 
describes 9 Factory Street (which would be destroyed under 
the FSU alternative) as a two story dwelling with the rear 
dating from c. 1857 and the front from the late 19th 
century; the statement describes No. 9 as "fair in both 
condition and integrity." Although it would have been 
helpful for the record to contain more detailed historical 
evaluations, we cannot hold that 9 Factory Street is of such 
different historical value that it was arbitrary for the 
defendants to select the alternative that would require No. 
9 to be taken. 
 
5. The Means Report 
 
Finally, plaintiffs allege that the Means Report, which 
concluded that the FSU alternative was the preferred 
choice, was excessively concerned with the economic 
benefits that Mill Street businesses would reap under the 
FSU alternative. They imply that this focus on economics 
prevented an unbiased analysis of the historic harm that 
the FSU alternative would inflict on the Factory Street area. 
In support of their argument, the plaintiffs point to 
language in the Means Report stating that "from a long- 
term economic vitality perspective, [the FSU Alternative] is 
the better of the two PennDoT configurations under active 
consideration." The plaintiffs contrast that conclusion with 
an acknowledgment in the Means Report that "if the 
Factory Street cut-and-cover alternative is built, not only 
does it do irreparable damage to the traditional skeleton of 
this remarkably intact 19th century town, it is highly 
probable that it will foreclose any hope of a bypass." From 
these two sentences, the plaintiffs argue that the Means 
Report acknowledged the serious damage the FSU 
alternative would have on the Historic District but 
 
                                22 
  
permitted the favorable economics of the FSU alternative to 
trump those historic concerns.10 
 
While these points weigh in the balance, what is 
dispositive is that the Means Report concluded that "the 
Factory Street cut-and-cover will have the lesser negative 
impact on the town's economic vitality and the overall 
community character of the Historic District." (emphasis 
added). The Means Report, which we find to be thorough 
and sensitive, by no means ignored the impact of each 
alternative on the historic properties. 
 
6. Affirmative Reasons for Selecting the FSU Alternative 
 
In addition to considering the FSU alternative's 
drawbacks, the defendants laid out in the administrative 
record a number of affirmative reasons why the FSU 
alternative will inflict less harm on the Historic District. 
First, the defendants concluded that the FSU alternative 
will physically and visually separate traffic from the Historic 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. While we need not decide whether the economic perspective is 
permissible, the notion that economic vitality will keep the historic 
character of Mill Street intact (whereas ignoring the economic health of 
the district might lead to further disintegration of Mill Street) might 
well 
be a relevant factor under the NHPA in a situation like this, where the 
economic and historic health of Mill Street are so tightly linked. Indeed, 
revitalizing the economic health of Mill Street was one of the stated 
purposes of the project. Mill Street merchants and professionals, who are 
dedicated to restoring the historic architecture on Mill Street, see supra 
at Part I, have formed the Danville Revitalization Corporation ("DRC"), 
which is committed to making capital investments in the physical 
appearance of Mill Street buildings and facades. Between 1993 and 
1996, the DRC contributed financially to twenty projects involving 
storefront, signage, and facade improvements. The merchants formed the 
DRC partly because the future success of the Mill Street business 
district turns on the district's ability to present a "pleasant, small 
town, 
main street environment in an historic architectural setting." They 
believe that the best way for Danville to achieve that kind of setting is 
by 
reducing traffic on Mill Street. It thus may be true that it is in both 
the 
historic and economic interests of Danville to reduce traffic on Mill 
Street 
and to protect the historic architecture that lines the street. However, 
as 
noted above, we need not decide the appropriateness of the economic 
perspective in this case. 
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District, especially on Factory and West Market Streets. 
This traffic currently runs the length of the Historic District 
on Mill Street. Under the No-Build and MS alternatives, 
cars would continue to use West Market and Factory 
Streets as a way to avoid the heavy traffic on Mill Street. 
Therefore, even under the MS alternative, Factory Street 
would not be free from traffic. The FSU alternative would 
thus better manage traffic by limiting the number of cars 
using Market Street and taking traffic underground for a 
fair part of its trip through Danville. 
 
Second, the defendants emphasize that the FSU 
Alternative will greatly reduce the crippling traffic on Mill 
Street, an area that is as much a part of Danville's Historic 
District as Factory Street is. The Means Report discusses 
the impact of Mill Street traffic as "contributing to 
buildings' physical decay," and "threaten[ing] the long-term 
life of the historic commercial structures that line" Mill 
Street. Ninety people currently live on Mill Street, and one 
of the goals of the project is to "restore the residential 
component of the Mill Street neighborhood." In balancing 
the harms and benefits of the various alternatives, the 
defendants justifiably concluded that the FSU alternative 
would do much good for Mill Street on an historic level. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the administrative record 
supports the FHWA's finding that the FSU alternative will 
minimize harm to the Danville Historic District. Even if we 
were to conclude that the MS and FSU alternatives would 
impose a comparable amount of harm to Danville's Historic 
District, we would be bound to uphold the Secretary's 
decision. These decisions are vested by law not in unelected 
judges but in the accountable Secretary. See Druid Hills, 
772 F.2d at 716 ("The Secretary is free to choose among 
alternatives which cause substantially equal damage to 
parks or historic sites."). The defendants performed a large 
number of studies on the various ways in which the 
alternatives would impact the Historic District and 
adequately weighed the results of the studies in selecting 
the preferred alternative. They also considered the more 
intangible benefits and harms to Mill and Factory Streets 
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under the competing alternatives. As the foregoing 
discussion demonstrates, they considered and responded to 
the comments of the ACHP. Therefore, they did not violate 
Section 106. And as that discussion also demonstrates, it 
was not arbitrary and capricious for the FHWA to select the 
FSU alternative under Section 4(f)(2). 
 
D. The MS&B Alternative 
 
The plaintiffs' final argument under Section 4(f)(2) is that 
the defendants violated the statute in designating the 
MS&B alternative "imprudent" and thus arbitrarily failing 
to consider the MS&B alternative in detail in the FEIS as a 
possible 4(f)(2) "least harm" alternative. 
 
Courts have held that an alternative that minimizes harm 
under Section 4(f)(2) can still be rejected if that alternative 
is infeasible or imprudent. See Hickory Neighborhood 
Defense League v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 58, 62 (4th Cir. 1990) 
(Hickory I) (acknowledging that Section 4(f)(2) contains an 
implied "feasible and prudent" test); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 
716; Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 
86 (5th Cir. 1976) (same). While the Supreme Court has 
articulated what "infeasible or imprudent" means in the 
4(f)(1) context, it has not spoken to what those terms mean 
in the 4(f)(2) context. Under Section 4(f)(1), an alternative is 
not a prudent alternative if there are truly unusual factors 
present, if the cost or community disruption resulting from 
the alternative reaches extraordinary magnitudes, or if the 
alternative presents unique problems. See Overton Park, 
401 U.S. at 413. We believe that we should apply a similar 
"feasible and prudent" determination to the world of 
alternatives that must be considered under 4(f)(2). See 
Louisiana Envtl. Soc'y, 537 F.2d at 86 ("Although there is 
no express feasible and prudent exception to subsection (2), 
the act clearly implies that one is present."). 
 
We note in this regard that 4(f)(1) sets a very high 
standard for excluding alternatives that do not use 
historically significant property, since Congress has 
determined that the use of such property should be avoided 
wherever possible. The standard under 4(f)(2) for 
eliminating alternatives need not be quite so high, since by 
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the time 4(f)(2) is reached, some historically significant 
property will necessarily be used, as is the case here. We 
therefore hold that the Secretary must consider every 
"feasible and prudent" alternative that uses historically 
significant land when deciding which alternative will 
minimize harm, but that the Secretary has slightly greater 
leeway--compared to a 4(f)(1) inquiry--in using its expertise 
as a federal agency to decide what the world of feasible and 
prudent alternatives should be under 4(f)(2). We also look 
for guidance to caselaw examining what "infeasible or 
imprudent" means in the 4(f)(1) context. 
 
The plaintiffs argue that the MS&B alternative, which 
would require defendants to build another bridge upstream 
to siphon off "through" traffic that now passes through 
Danville on its way to a remote location, would minimize 
the harm to the Historic District by leaving Factory Street 
intact while reducing Mill Street congestion. They also point 
out that the Means Report concluded, "Ideally, and most 
leaders we discussed it with agree, a bypass is the answer." 
 
The defendants rejected the MS&B option without 
performing an in-depth analysis of it because they 
concluded the option was imprudent and thus undeserving 
of inclusion in the balancing-of-harms test mandated by 
Druid Hills. In the FEIS, the defendants offered four reasons 
why they had not evaluated MS&B thoroughly and why 
they had deemed the MS&B alternative imprudent and 
infeasible. 
 
First, the defendants performed a study that asked 
drivers who used the Danville-Riverside Bridge whether 
they would use an upstream bypass. The 50% response 
rate resulted in 3,500 completed surveys, which the 
defendants felt was a sufficient sample size. Only 25% of 
the respondents indicated that they would use a bypass. 
The plaintiffs rejoin that most of the responses came from 
local traffic, so that the results were skewed downwards, 
though it is not clear in the record that most of the 
respondents were traveling locally. A 809 (charting purpose 
of respondent's trip but not destination).11 A determination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The plaintiffs are concerned that the proportion of tractor-trailer 
responses (which comprised 2% of the total responses) is not 
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that 75% of traffic would continue to use the Danville- 
Riverside Bridge calls into serious question the usefulness 
of the bypass alternative in drawing traffic away from 
Danville. See, e.g., Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. 
Skinner, 910 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hickory II) 
(Secretary may reject as imprudent alternatives that will 
not solve or reduce existing traffic problems). 
 
Second, the defendants cited the cost of the project as 
high enough to render the MS&B alternative imprudent. 
The defendants believed that, for financial reasons, only 
one structure could be built, and that building a bypass 
upstream would foreclose the most important part of the 
project, which was to replace the Danville-Riverside Bridge. 
They stated, "There is not, at this time, funding allocated 
and programming scheduled to allow the study and 
construction of a bypass bridge." While no cost studies 
were performed on the MS&B alternative, it is reasonable to 
assume that the costs required to build not only another 
bridge but also to lay over a mile of roadway and to cover 
condemnation, litigation, planning, engineering, and 
building costs for that roadway might total many times 
what would be required to rebuild the Danville-Riverside 
Bridge. Overton Park held that an agency may not exclude 
an alternative as imprudent under 4(f)(1) based on cost 
unless the costs would be of "extraordinary magnitudes." 
401 U.S. at 413. Here, it appears that the costs of an 
additional bridge would meet the definition of 
"extraordinary." 
 
Third, the defendants highlighted the impact of the 
additional construction that would be necessary to build 
the MS&B alternative. The MS&B alternative would require 
that two bridges be built instead of one, and that an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
representative of the makeup of current bridge traffic. Plaintiffs 
calculate 
that trucks actually account for 12.5% of all bridge traffic. 
Nevertheless, 
even if we assume that there were additional responses by truck drivers 
such that the proportion of trucks in the survey was 12.5%, and that 
each of the additional responses stated that the truck driver would use 
the bypass, the survey would have demonstrated that only 33% of 
current bridge users would choose the bypass. We believe that a 33% 
predicted use rate still calls into question the usefulness of the bypass 
alternative. 
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additional 5,500 feet of road be laid, forcing construction 
that would impact the environment and communities near 
the second bridge site. Fourth, the defendants argued that 
there was no need for a bypass, as the FSU or MS 
alternative could fill the project needs on its own. 
 
Even if the cost increases would not be extraordinary, the 
problematic results of the use survey and the community 
and environmental disruption that would result from the 
additional construction combine to suggest that the MS&B 
alternative was neither prudent nor feasible. In the 4(f)(1) 
context, courts have held that an accumulation of smaller 
problems that, standing alone, would not individually 
constitute unique problems may together comprise 
sufficient reason for rejecting an alternative as imprudent. 
See Committee to Preserve Boomer Lake Park v. Department 
of Transp., 4 F.3d 1543, 1550 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Although 
none of these factors alone is clearly sufficient justification 
to reject the alternatives in this case, their cumulative 
weight is sufficient to support the Secretary's decision."); 
Hickory II, 910 F.2d at 163 (holding that a cumulation of 
problems may be sufficient reason to reject an alternative 
as imprudent); Eagle Found., Inc. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798, 
805 (7th Cir. 1987) (same). 
 
In sum, we cannot conclude that it was arbitrary to reject 
this alternative in view of the low predicted use rate, the 
impact of the added construction, and the enormously 
increased costs, all of which, taken together, make the 
MS&B alternative imprudent for minimizing harm under 
4(f)(2). We therefore hold that the defendants did not violate 
the requirements of Section 4(f) by failing to consider the 
MS&B alternative in greater detail. 
 
E. NEPA 
 
While 4(f)(2) ensures that the Secretary puts his thumb 
on the scales in favor of protecting historic properties, 
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. S 4321 et seq., governs the procedures 
surrounding the requisite balancing. Under NEPA, 
Congress directed all agencies of the federal government to 
 
       include in every recommendation or report on 
       proposals for legislation and other major Federal 
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       actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
       environment, a detailed statement by the responsible 
       official on-- 
 
       (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
 
       (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot 
       be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
 
       (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
 
       (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of 
       man's environment and the maintenance and 
       enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
 
       (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
       resources which would be involved in the proposed 
       action should it be implemented. 
 
       Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible 
       Federal official shall consult with and obtain the 
       comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction 
       by law or special expertise with respect to any 
       environmental impact involved. 
 
Id. S 4332(2)(C). 
 
The agency must also "study, develop, and describe 
appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action 
in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts 
concerning alternative uses of available resources .. . ." Id. 
S 4332(2)(E). The detailed statement, known as an 
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), is the device that 
promotes the fulfillment of NEPA's goal, which is to "control 
the more destructive effects of man's technology on his 
environment." Township of Springfield v. Lewis, 702 F.2d 
426, 429 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). 
 
The way in which NEPA achieves that goal is a 
procedural one. NEPA ensures that an agency has before it 
detailed information on significant environmental impacts 
when it makes its decisions and guarantees that this 
information is available to a larger audience. See Inland 
Empire Pub. Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 
F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1996). "NEPA exists to ensure a 
process, not to ensure any result." Id. ; see also Baltimore 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
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462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (NEPA requires an agency to take a 
"hard look" at the potential environmental consequences of 
proposed projects before taking action); Laguna Greenbelt, 
Inc. v. United States Dep't of Transp., 42 F.3d 517, 523 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (NEPA does not mandate particular substantive 
results, but instead imposes only procedural requirements). 
 
Under NEPA, an agency decision "to go forward with a 
major federal action after the agency has prepared and 
considered an Environmental Impact Statement, requires 
the court to determine whether all necessary procedures 
were followed, to consider de novo all relevant questions of 
law, and to examine the facts to determine whether the 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion." See Concord Township v. United States, 625 
F.2d 1068, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Marsh v. Oregon 
Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1989) 
(stating that courts are to review factual disputes that 
implicate substantial agency expertise under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard). We make "a pragmatic judgment 
whether the [EIS's] form, content and preparation foster 
both informed decision-making and informed public 
participation," and "[o]nce satisfied that a proposing agency 
has taken a `hard look' at a decision's environmental 
consequences, [our] review is at an end." City of Carmel-by- 
the-Sea v. United States Dep't of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 
1150-51 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 
 
The plaintiffs contend that the EIS was inadequate 
because it failed to consider the MS&B alternative, and that 
the FHWA therefore violated NEPA. Specifically, the 
plaintiffs allege that the FHWA only considered the Bypass 
alternative as a stand-alone alternative--rather than 
considering it in conjunction with the MS alternative--and 
therefore rejected the bypass as not meeting the primary 
purpose of the bridge replacement project. As discussed 
above, the plaintiffs believe that the combined MS&B 
alternative would most successfully achieve the goals of the 
project: to replace the bridge and to limit the traffic volume 
on Mill Street. To the extent that FHWA did consider the 
MS&B alternative, the plaintiffs argue, FHWA rejected it on 
the ground that funding was not available for both a new 
bridge and a bypass, and the plaintiffs allege that lack of 
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present funding is an improper reason to reject a viable 
alternative. 
 
The defendants respond that they considered the MS&B 
alternative in the DEIS and FEIS and rejected it as an 
unreasonable alternative for the four reasons it rejected the 
alternative under Section 4(f)(2): the origin and destination 
study indicated that the great majority of traffic would 
continue to use the Danville-Riverside Bridge rather than 
the bypass; it would vastly increase the scope and 
construction costs of the project; the FSU alternative alone 
would satisfy the needs of the project; and it would cause 
greater social and environmental impacts than the MS or 
FSU alternative would on its own. 
 
NEPA requires the defendants to consider only 
"reasonable" alternatives in the EIS. See Presidio Golf Club 
v. National Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that agency must look at "every reasonable 
alternative" but "set forth only those alternatives necessary 
to permit a reasoned choice"); Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 713 
(stating that the EIS should "go beyond mere assertions" 
and should devote substantial treatment to "all reasonable 
alternatives"). A number of courts recently have addressed 
the extent to which federal agencies must consider 
alternatives under NEPA. These courts have concluded that 
where the agency has examined a breadth of alternatives 
but has excluded from consideration alternatives that 
would not meet the goals of the project, the agency has 
satisfied NEPA. See, e.g., Morongo Band of Mission Indians 
v. Federal Aviation Administration, 161 F.3d 569, 575-76 
(9th Cir. 1998) (upholding the defendants' consideration of 
alternatives under NEPA as sufficient to permit a reasoned 
choice); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. 
Dombeck, 164 F.3d 1115, 1129 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding 
agency's decision where the FEIS had considered ten 
alternative plans of action based on visitor levels and effects 
of visitor use, eliminated two alternatives that were deemed 
impractical for failing to meet the goals of the project, and 
adequately explained why increased visitor use was not a 
viable goal). 
 
In the instant case, the defendants sufficiently explained 
why the MS&B alternative was not feasible and why it did 
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not warrant a highly detailed examination. The plaintiffs' 
argument that the MS&B alternative possibly could help 
achieve the two project goals of replacing the bridge and 
reducing Mill Street congestion encounters the same 
responses that the FHWA offered under Section 4(f): low 
use rate and excessive construction and environmental 
costs. In addition, in arguing for the MS&B alternative, the 
plaintiffs have not offered a "specific, detailed 
counterproposal that had a chance of success." See City of 
Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295, 298 (9th 
Cir. 1975) (holding that EIS did not have to consider 
alternative sites where plaintiffs failed to allege specific 
evidentiary facts showing that the alternative sites were 
reasonable and viable). 
 
In Druid Hills, the court concluded, "Although the EIS 
does not contain what some may feel is a detailed and 
careful analysis of the relative environmental merits and 
demerits of the proposed action and possible alternatives, 
we find no sufficient basis in the record to disturb the 
district court's conclusion that appellees adequately 
analyzed the alternatives." Id. at 713; see also City of 
Carmel, 123 F.3d at 1151 (upholding a "reasonably 
thorough" FEIS). There is necessarily a limit to the 
thoroughness with which an agency can analyze every 
option, see Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 575 (noting that, 
without parameters and criteria, an agency could generate 
countless alternatives), and our standard of review is quite 
deferential, see Corridor H Alternatives, Inc. v. Slater, 166 
F.3d 368, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We conclude that the 
defendants adequately considered the MS&B alternative 
and its attendant flaws before rejecting it as infeasible. We 
therefore will affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants on the NEPA issue as well. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
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